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Abstract 
This research examines the relative importance that customers place on product reliability, or things-gone-
wrong, and customization, or things-gone-right, across a range of industrial settings. We integrate an 
evolutionary theory of technology with a dynamic theory of competition to predict that: (1) when 
technological intensity is relatively low or high, customers place greater value on customization and (2) 
when technological intensity is more intermediate, product reliability and customization are more equally 
important. The predictions are tested and supported using data from the American Customer Satisfaction 
Index (ACSI) survey. 
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1. Introduction 
 Quality experts and customer satisfaction researchers emphasize two general types of quality, the 
degree to which a good or service provides key customer requirements, or customization, and how 
reliably these requirements are delivered, or reliability (Fornell, Johnson, Anderson, Cha, & Bryant, 1996; 
Juran & Gryna, 1988). Firms face very different strategic implications for improving quality depending 
on which of these dimensions is most important to customers (Johannsen, 1996a, 1996b; Raynor, 1992). 
Improving customization requires more of a joint customer–technology focus (Griffin & Hauser, 1996), 
while improving reliability requires more of an internal process improvement or quality control focus 
(Deming, 1981; Feigenbaum, 1991). 
 There is disagreement, however, as to the relative importance of customization and reliability 
across contexts. One argument is that companies have generally mastered the secrets of internal quality or 
improved reliability. Now that the ‘‘low hanging fruit’’ has been fixed, investing in R&D, combined with 
a deep understanding of customers’ needs, is the key to reaching the ‘‘high hanging fruit.’’ Thus, 
customization should be the key driver of satisfaction and loyalty for products and services alike (Fornell 
et al., 1996). Alternatively, the relative importance of customization and reliability may depend on the 
stage of the product and technology life cycle (Ettlie, 2000). Whereas customization should be more 
important early in the lifecycle, reliability becomes more important as the product category matures. 
Another argument in favor of reliability is that many internal quality programs were never implemented 
correctly in the first place (Cole, 1998). Although there were initial successes in the TQM movement, 
rarely were the changes institutionalized. Thus, reliability may remain critically important to a firm’s 
success. 
 The goal of this research is to provide insight into this debate. We develop a theoretical model 
that predicts the relative importance of reliability versus customization in driving customer satisfaction 
and loyalty. The model integrates a dynamic theory of competition and market behavior from marketing 
theory (Dickson, 1992; Hunt & Morgan, 1995) with technological intensity trade-offs from the 
management of technology literature (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Utterback & Abernathy, 1975). 
 Our model predicts that when technological intensity is either relatively low or high, customers 
place greater relative value on customization. When technological intensity is more intermediate, product 
reliability and customization are more equal in importance. The predictions are tested using data from the 
American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) survey. We find strong support for this hypothesized 
inverted U-shaped relationship between technological intensity and the relative importance of reliability 
versus customization in driving satisfaction and loyalty. 
 
2. Customization, reliability, and technological intensity 
 The definition of quality has evolved over time. A common view toward the latter part of the 20th 
century is the definition that quality is conformance to requirements and customer specifications (Reeves 
& Bednar, 1994). This definition emphasizes two underlying dimensions of quality. One is having a 
proper set of customer-defined requirements or specifications in the first place. The second is having a 
production, delivery, and maintenance process that conforms to the specifications. These dimensions are 
central to Juran’s concept of ‘‘fitness for use’’ (Juran & Gryna, 1988). Customer-defined quality results 
from product performance, defined as the degree of customization, and freedom from deficiencies, or how 
reliably the product meets its specifications. We refer to these two components of quality as 
customization and reliability. 
 An advantage of this two-dimensional view of quality is that it allows us to make comparisons 
across very different firms and industries. Within any given industry, firm, or even market segment, the 
quality dimensions that drive customer satisfaction and loyalty are many and varied (Garvin, 1984; 
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Gustafsson & Johnson, 1997; Parasuraman, Zeithaml, & Berry, 1985). Yet, all the dimensions may be 
viewed, at some level, as falling under the categories of customization and reliability. 
 There is no general agreement as to the relative importance of these quality dimensions across 
contexts. Corporate strategy and marketing scholars have argued that companies have more or less 
mastered the secrets of internal quality, or improved reliability, decreasing their value as a source of 
competitive advantage. As we have moved from a focus on internal quality to a focus on customers and 
market pressures, squeezing more variance out of a manufacturing process should not increase quality and 
satisfaction as much as tailoring goods and services to meet customer needs (Fornell et al., 1996; 
Johnson, 1998). The tools for improving reliability are well known and easily disseminated, which makes 
it difficult for firms to use reliability to differentiate themselves in the eyes of customers. Rather, 
differential advantage is more likely to come from factors related to customization (Porter, 1996). 
 Research on strategic quality is consistent with this view. Johannsen’s (1996a, 1996b) strategic 
quality management (SQM) framework emphasizes that strategic management and total quality 
management should be an integrated management process. Similarly, Raynor (1992) views strategic 
quality as an entire system of thought that goes well beyond functional excellence. Inspired by Japanese 
hoshin kanri or policy deployment (Imai, 1997), SQM views quality management as an integral part of an 
overall or ‘‘total’’ strategy, planning, and implementation process. 
 However, significant barriers remain between strategic planning and the implementation of 
quality practices (Morgan & Piercy, 1998). Most organizations continue to use quality management on a 
strictly tactical basis. While they implement quality circles, process reengineering, cycle time reduction, 
or statistical process control, organizations fail to address questions related to strategic quality and the 
resulting customization of their product/service mix (Recardo, 1993). For example, in an earlier study of 
35 firms’ experience with quality function deployment (QFD), we found a basic tension between a firm’s 
ability to improve internal operations and focus on customers (Ettlie & Johnson, 1994). Specifically, 
benchmarking on best practices to improve one’s own operations led to a decrease in customer focus. 
Taken together, the strategic quality literature is thus consistent with the marketing literature in 
suggesting that customization is the neglected dimension in need of broad-based improvement across 
firms and industries. 
 Fornell et al. (1996) provide empirical support for this proposition using the 1994 baseline ACSI 
data. Using customization and reliability as two different measures of overall quality, the measurement 
loadings (the correlations between the customization and reliability measures and the overall quality 
index) suggest that customization is more important across industries. The average loading for 
customization was .906 compared to .770 for reliability. For all industry sectors, the loadings for 
customization are higher than the loadings for reliability. 
 In contrast, the management of technology literature suggests that reliability should be more 
important, at least in certain contexts. The evolutionary theory of technology (Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Utterback & Abernathy, 1975) suggests that there are stages of product maturity at which process 
improvement (reliability) is more important to customers than product innovation (customization). 
Whereas product innovation is more critical in the early phases of a product life cycle, process 
improvement becomes the more critical dimension as the product technology matures. This suggests that 
reliability should become more important after the dominant design has emerged and product competition 
has stabilized. This maturity is typical of many of the industries included in the ACSI survey. 
 Cole (1998) provides another argument as to why reliability continues to be an important source 
of differentiation. The way that internal quality improvement is typically deployed, as through Crosby’s 
(1980) ‘‘quality is free’’ initiative, may actually hurt the cause of a sustained process quality. Such 
programs are rarely company-wide, and often require employees to follow agreed upon requirements 
without a mechanism for continuous improvement. 
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 A more complete picture of the relative importance of customization and reliability requires an 
integration of perspectives. From marketing, we borrow from the dynamic theories of competition and 
market behavior that have evolved in recent decades. We integrate the dynamic view of competition with 
the evolutionary theory of product versus process innovation. 
 
2.1. Dynamic theory of competition 
 Dynamic theories of competition and market behavior have existed for some time within the 
Austrian School (Garrison, 1978; Reekie & Savitt, 1988). The dynamic view took hold in marketing 
through Alderson’s work on sorting and transformation processes and his concept of market matching 
(Alderson, 1957, 1965). A primary feature of Alderson’s work is its focus on the process of how markets 
operate. Alderson’s framework replaces homogeneity with heterogeneity as the economic norm. This 
heterogeneity exists with respect to both that which customers demand and that which suppliers offer. 
Marketing is viewed as a dynamic or ongoing process of attempting to attain a match between 
heterogeneity in demand and heterogeneity in supply (versus the attainment of a static equilibrium). 
 More recent approaches build upon Alderson and the Austrian School. Dickson’s (1992) 
framework distinguishes between macromarket behavior and firm behavior (competitive rationality). The 
macromarket is characterized by continuous changes in both the heterogeneity of supply and the 
heterogeneity of demand. That is, both economic processes and buyers preferences are constantly 
changing due to changes in space, time, technology, form, and information. Individual firms competing in 
this environment vary in three important ways. First is their ability and willingness to innovate or 
improve. Second is their ability and willingness to learn from their experiences and/or imitate what others 
are doing. Third is their ability and willingness to follow through and implement what they have 
innovated, learned, and imitated. 
 Dickson argues that the differences in firms’ abilities and motivations to innovate, learn, and 
implement explain why total congruence between heterogeneity in demand and heterogeneity in supply is 
constantly sought but never achieved. Similarly, Hunt and Morgan (1995) argue that demand and supply 
are heterogeneous and constantly changing. These authors further emphasize that both customer 
information and firm information is imperfect and costly to obtain, which is consistent with the argument 
that congruence is constantly sought but not achieved. Overall, the dynamic approach predicts that there 
is a meaningful level of unmet customer needs in a market at any given point in time, regardless of 
product, market, or technology maturity. 
 
2.2. Evolutionary theory of innovation 
 The dynamic theory in marketing has a parallel in the form of an evolutionary theory of 
technology and innovation (Utterback & Abernathy, 1975). The evolutionary approach challenges an 
earlier model, advanced by March and Simon (1958), that there is a continuous steady-state pressure 
towards innovation due to the notion that aspiration levels do not remain constant but tend to rise slowly 
over time. 
 Utterback and Abernathy (1975) proposed an alternative model of the ‘‘evolution of the 
productive segment’’ of a firm. They predicted and found a systematic pattern of innovation that develops 
as a company matures that involves three stages. Early in a product life cycle, product innovation 
(dramatically improving a product’s specifications) is stressed relative to process innovation (improving a 
product’s production, delivery, and maintenance processes). Product innovation is a differentiator when 
only one or a subset of competing firms has the technology. In Stage 2, imitation and competition 
increases, product niches are filled, and industry shake out occurs. As a result, product innovation 
becomes less important in differentiating among competitors. The basis of competition forces players to 
shift to process innovation as reliability and cost reductions become greater customer concerns. For 
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example, in comparing the automotive and electronic industries, Choi and Rungtusanatham (1999) find 
that SQM is more actively practiced in the automotive industry where the market is more mature and the 
life cycles longer. In Stage 3, competition is based primarily on cost. R&D-based product innovation is 
quite low. Significant customization still occurs, but in a much different fashion from the early stages of a 
technology life cycle. Firms ‘‘backtrack’’ or ‘‘demature’’ by using existing technology in new and 
creative ways to better meet the needs of particular market segments. From a cost standpoint, firms also 
move production overseas when threatened in stage three by competitors. 
 Assumptions in Utterback and Abernathy’s approach were, in part, inspired by the view that 
investments in R&D are often an ad hoc response to market evolution rather than a policy or strategy 
decision. Nelson and Winter (1982) argue that a firm cannot possibly find an optimal, equilibrium-based 
R&D strategy unless the cost of invention and demand is completely taken into account and all 
alternatives are considered, which is unlikely. Thus, the evolutionary approach, like the dynamic theory of 
competition in marketing, is consistent with the assumptions of the Austrian School. The theory takes a 
successful new technology or innovation as a starting point that is historically followed by a wave of 
minor innovations (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Tushman and Anderson (1986) empirically demonstrate this 
pattern of innovation for three industries, including commercial aircraft.  
 As product innovation evolves, it faces a trajectory of diminishing returns in the form of a frontier 
of achievable capabilities. Trajectories can be specific to a particular case and can be complementary, like 
engine power and the streamlining of aircraft. But, more generally, natural trajectories seem to share the 
tendency of progressive exploitation of latent economies of scale (productivity gains) and increasing the 
mechanization and reliability of operations (process improvement). Under evolutionary theory, industries 
with rapid technical progress generally have high R&D expenditures. When R&D expenditures are 
smaller and become more concentrated, technical progress is slower. 
 
2.3. An integration of dynamic competition and evolutionary theory 
 When taken together, the dynamic and evolutionary views provide a more complete model of just 
how important customization and reliability should be at different levels of technological intensity. 
Central to the dynamic theory of competition is that customer needs are constantly changing. Central to 
the evolutionary theory of technology are systematic changes in technological intensity vis-a`-vis process 
improvement. Firms characterized by high R&D intensity have a relatively low process improvement 
focus. Firms characterized by moderate R&D intensity have a more equal product and process focus as 
process improvements and cost reductions become a more important means to compete. Finally, firms 
with a low or mature R&D intensity focus primarily on process improvements and productivity gains, 
often through means that do not require very large investments in either product or process technology 
(like quality improvement programs and customer service). 
 Now, consider the joint effects of the two theories on the relative importance of customization 
and reliability for customers. Our predictions here are based on the notion that at any given level of R&D 
intensity, there are relatively stable differences across firms with respect to customization, reliability, 
satisfaction, and loyalty (Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991). These differences allow us to observe the impact 
of customization versus reliability on satisfaction and loyalty across firms. For high R&D intensity firms, 
the emergence of new technologies and innovations provides a means of dramatically improving 
customer specifications, or customization, vis-a`-vis the technology being replaced (such as a new 
generation printer or PC). Thus, improvements in customization should have the greater impact on 
customer satisfaction and subsequent loyalty. This is consistent with Dickson’s (1992) argument that a 
firm’s ability and willingness to innovate is the first step in adapting to heterogeneous customer needs. 
 In contrast, firms that are more intermediate in their R&D intensity find it more difficult to ‘‘push 
the envelope’’ of existing dominant designs (in terms of customer specifications) in a way that creates a 
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competitive advantage. Both the marketing and technology management theories predict more imitation 
among such firms, gradually making differences in customization less of a differentiator. Following 
evolutionary theory, organizations shift their efforts to compete on process improvements and 
productivity gains. We thus predict that customization and reliability become more equal in importance 
for the customers of these firms.  
 For low R&D intensity firms nontechnology-based process improvements and productivity gains 
(cost reductions) come to dominate firms’ activities as they shift their resources even further from product 
to process as with continuous improvement programs. However, process innovations are subject to 
diminishing returns, both with respect to perceived reliability (as reliability becomes a ‘‘basic or 
expected’’ dimension; Kano, Seraku, Takahashi, & Tsuji, 1984) and cost reductions (Best, 2000). Firms 
produce relatively mature products (soap, soft drinks, and gasoline) with very high reliability. As a result, 
reliability becomes less important to customers relative to moderate R&D intensity firms. At the same 
time, the dynamic theory of competition argues that the heterogeneity of customer demand has not 
remained static. Rather, it has continued to change and evolve through the course of an extended 
technology life cycle. Heterogeneity in demand, a lack of congruence between supply and demand, and a 
need for customization remain. (Ultimately, new technologies come along to help meet this need for 
customization.) Therefore, customization should once again become the more important driver of 
customer satisfaction and loyalty, and will likely be the focus of any, albeit diminished, technology 
resources available. 
 The type of customer who buys low, moderate and high R&D products is also likely to vary. The 
more innovative the technology, the more early adopters are purchasing and using the product (Ettlie, 
2000). These early adopters are generally better problem solvers (Howard, 1983). If reliability problems 
do occur with the technology, early adopters are more willing and able to deal with the problems 
themselves. Consistent with our arguments, ‘‘things gone wrong’’ should not be particularly important to 
these customers. Rather, they place great value on improving ‘‘things gone right.’’ The more mature the 
technology, the broader and more risk averse the customer base making reliability a more important issue, 
at least when it is a basis for differentiation. Our arguments suggest that this reliability differentiation 
exists for firms that are more intermediate in their technology life cycle and R&D expenditures. The 
rationale for this argument is that firms at the beginning and during the second stage of the technology 
evolution have the greatest resources available for technology investments, whether these investments 
focus on product improvements or new processing technologies. 
 To illustrate our predictions, consider an example involving three products offered by different 
firms in our subsequent empirical study: beer, refrigerators, and PCs. A relatively high level of R&D 
expenditure characterizes certain PC firms. New PC designs and technologies result in dramatic increases 
in the ability of the product to meet customer needs. Customers are willing to put up with some level of 
‘‘things gone wrong’’ because the increase in ‘‘things gone right’’ is so great. Refrigerator production 
involves a more moderate level of R&D expenditure and market maturity. While there are still significant 
increases in customization due to technology that impact satisfaction and loyalty (such as new interior 
designs and features), reliability and cost become more salient and important. Finally, beer production is a 
relatively mature technology (firms producing beer have relatively low R&D expenditures). The maturity 
of the technology means that process improvements have already been exploited to a large degree; there 
are relatively few ‘‘things gone wrong’’ across competitors. But, customer needs continue to change and 
shift in a dynamic fashion. Significant demand heterogeneity remains. In response, producers become 
creative with existing technologies (Utterback and Abernathy’s ‘‘dematuration’’ process) to provide an 
ever changing and wider variety of beers that vary on both functional and social psychological 
dimensions in an attempt to adapt to changing customer needs. The emergence of microbreweries is as an 
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example of dematuration of the malted beverage industry. Customization again becomes the key to 
increasing satisfaction and loyalty, but existing technology is used for this transition. 
 
2.4. Hypotheses 
 We formalize our predictions as hypotheses, one for each of three levels of technological 
intensity: 
 
Hypothesis 1: For high-technology intensive firms, perceived product customization has a 
greater impact on satisfaction and subsequent loyalty than does perceived reliability. 
 
Hypothesis 2: For moderate-technology intensive firms, perceived product customization and 
perceived reliability have equal impacts on satisfaction and subsequent loyalty. 
 
Hypothesis 3: For low-technology intensive firms, perceived product customization has a 
greater impact on satisfaction and subsequent loyalty than does perceived reliability. 
 
3. Methodology 
 The hypotheses are tested using a sample of firms that vary in their base level of technological 
intensity as measured by investments in research and development (R&D) over a finite period of time. 
The firms are all part of the ACSI database (Fornell et al., 1996). We categorize the firms into low, 
moderate, and high R&D intensity respectively and then explore the relative impact of customization 
versus reliability on satisfaction and loyalty for each category of firms. 
 It should be noted that our data is a level of aggregation above our theoretical predictions. 
That is, our R&D spending and customer data is at the firm level, while our theoretical arguments pertain 
to particular product categories and technology life cycles. This is because both our R&D and customer 
data is available at the firm level. Thus, each of our observations represents some average over a firm’s 
offerings. Importantly, the theory still applies to these averages. Contrast this with the case where the 
theory applies to an entire firm while the data is from particular and potentially idiosyncratic product 
categories. In the next sections, we describe the sample of firms, their R&D classifications, and the 
customer survey information used in our analyses. 
 
3.1. The sample 
 We focus on the 53 manufacturing firms in the ACSI survey that also publicly report R&D 
spending, which serves are our proxy for technological maturity. We use satisfaction survey results from 
1994 through 1998. In a very small number of cases (49 out 1060 observations or 4.6%) there were 
missing values for a particular firm-level survey observation (for customization, reliability, satisfaction, 
or loyalty). In these cases, we replaced the value with the previous year’s value for the firm on the 
variable. This is consistent with the observed stability of the ACSI measures over time. 
 The R&D measures are taken from 1993 through 1997, and they consist of research intensity 
(R&D spending as a percentage of sales). Although a variety of measures of evolution of the productive 
segment technology is possible, the most commonly used is R&D intensity for a number of reasons. First, 
most firms keep track of R&D expenditures and sales, so the number is easy to calculate. Second, this 
ratio is usually quite stable over time for firms and is extremely useful for policy analysis (see, for 
example, Lin, 1996; Margolis & Kammen, 1999; Viscusi & Moore, 1993). The 1-year lag in R&D versus 
the survey data is based on the assumption that it will take at least 1 year for investments in technology to 
show up in products that customers have had the time and experience to be able to evaluate. 
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 A principal-components analysis of the 4 years of R&D data across firms reveals that a single 
factor explains 96.8% of the variation in R&D spending. The loadings for the factor ranged from 0.981 to 
0.987. Consistent with the studies cited above, this supports an extremely stable level of R&D spending 
by firms over the limited time period studied. These results suggest that the technology life cycles being 
studied involve much longer time periods. Consistent with our analyses, the R&D differences that do 
exist are more firm and industry based. A k-means clustering analysis reveals three distinct clusters of 
firms that differ significantly in their R&D spending (F = 269.056, P < .001). A histogram of these R&D 
intensity levels for the firms similarly reveals that the firms fall naturally into low, moderate and high 
intensity categories. 
 Table 1 shows the resulting classification of firms. The low intensity firms (n = 28) had an 
average R&D spending from 1993 through 1997 of 1.00% of sales (observations ranging from 0.28% to 
2.18%). The moderate intensity firms (n = 11) had an average R&D spending of 3.42% of sales (ranging 
from 2.72% to 4.39%), while the high intensity firms (n = 14) spent 5.48% of sales on R&D (ranging 
from 4.98% to 7.42%). The firms are predominately manufacturing firms (where the core product is a 
physical good), although some telecommunications companies are included (three in the low R&D 
intensity category and one in the moderate R&D intensity category). It is interesting that, in more than 
one case, firms from the same industry (such as food products, electronics, automotive, and 
telecommunications) span more than one R&D category. Among packaged goods companies, for 
example, Kellogg is categorized as low while Proctor and Gamble is moderate. Among personal computer 
companies, Compaq is moderate while Apple is high. And, among consumer electronics companies, 
Zenith is moderate and Sony is high. This demonstrates that the categories are not simply a function of 
industry differences. 
 
3.1.1. The ACSI data 
 We use customer-based measures of perceived customization, reliability, overall satisfaction, and 
loyalty from the ACSI survey. (For a complete description of the ACSI survey and methodology, see 
Fornell et al., 1996.) The ACSI model uses quality as a driver of customer satisfaction while satisfaction 
drives customer loyalty. The model is estimated for each of approximate 200 firms annually and based on 
a random sample telephone survey of approximately 250 of a firm’s customers. Our interest is in the 
overall satisfaction index, loyalty index, and the survey ratings for the two dimensions of quality 
(customization and reliability) for each firm in a given year. Specifically, we examine the impact that 
customization and reliability ratings have on the satisfaction and loyalty indices to determine the relative 
importance of each quality dimension and how it varies by the level of technological intensity of a firm. 
 The satisfaction index is a weighted average of three overall evaluation measures: (1) an overall 
rating of satisfaction, (2) the degree to which performance falls short of or exceeds expectations, and (3) a 
rating of overall performance relative to the customer’s ideal good or service in the category. The 1–10 
point scale ratings for these measures are combined into a weighted average and rescaled to provide a 0–
100-point satisfaction index (see Fornell et al., 1996 for details). Our measures for customization and 
reliability are on their original 1–10 point scales (where 1 = poor customization/reliability and 10 = 
excellent customization/reliability). 
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Customization is an evaluation of how well the product has fit the customer’s personal requirements. 
Reliability is an evaluation of how often things have gone wrong with the product. 
 Loyalty in the model is a customer’s psychological predisposition to repurchase from a particular 
product or service provider. There are two measures of customer loyalty in the ACSI model. The first is a 
rating of repurchase likelihood. The second is constructed from two survey ratings: the degree to which a 
firm could raise its price(s) as a percentage before the customer would definitely not choose to buy from 
that firm again the next time (given the customer has indicated that he or she is likely to repurchase), and 
the degree to which a firm would have to lower its price(s) as a percentage before the customer would 
definitely choose again from that firm the next time (given the customer has indicated that he or she is 
unlikely to repurchase). 
 It is important that any differences that we observe with respect to our R&D categories are not 
due to simple differences in the levels of perceived customization and reliability per se. As a pretest, a 
simple MANOVA analysis was performed using R&D category as the independent variable and 
customization and reliability as dependent variables. The results show that while the two dependent 
variables are correlated, their levels do not differ significantly across R&D categories. 
3.1.2. Empirical model and analyses 
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 Our primary analyses use a quality–satisfaction–loyalty model to estimate the pattern of effects 
for each of the low, moderate, and high R&D intensity categories. In the model, presented in Fig. 1, our 
two general dimensions of quality (customization quality and reliability quality) impact overall 
satisfaction, which in turn impacts loyalty. The model estimations serve two important purposes. First, 
 
 
they show the impact that each quality driver has on satisfaction across R&D categories. Second, the 
models treat satisfaction as mediating the effects of quality on loyalty, which is consistent with the 
established causal relationships among these constructs (Gustafsson & Johnson, 1997). 
 In order to use all 5 years of available data, we follow Fornell and Johnson’s (1993) approach and 
use the year-to-year observations as reflective measures of an underlying, stable level of each construct. 
Reliability, customization, satisfaction, and loyalty are measured using observations for the firms from 
1994 through 1998. Given the extreme serial (year-to-year) correlation in this type of data, this approach 
essentially extracts the stable level of each construct as a latent variable for use in estimating the impacts 
of customization and reliability on satisfaction and subsequent loyalty. 
 Statistical estimation of a satisfaction model (such as the model in Fig. 1) should accommodate a 
network of cause-and-effect relationships (from quality, to satisfaction, to loyalty) that contains latent 
variables. We use partial least squares (PLS) to estimate the model, which is particularly well suited to the 
skewed data and small samples that are typical in quality and satisfaction data (Gustafsson & Johnson, 
1997; Steenkamp & van Trijp, 1996). PLS is essentially an iterative estimation procedure that integrates 
principal-components analysis with multiple regression (Fornell & Cha, 1994). The objective of PLS is to 
explain variance in the endogenous variables in the model, in this case satisfaction and loyalty. PLS 
models were estimated separately for the low, moderate and high technological intensity firms. 
Jackknife analysis was then used to determine the significance of the parameter estimates. 
 In addition to the PLS analyses, we estimate a general linear model to determine whether the 
influence of customization and reliability on satisfaction varies significantly by level of technological 
intensity. This analysis uses the R&D categories as a three-level factor, a 5-year weighted average for 
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both customization and reliability as covariates and a 5-year weighted average for satisfaction as the 
dependent variable. The weighted averages were again determined by taking the first principle component 
for each set of measures across the 5 years of observation. 
 
4. Results 
 The PLS models illustrate the relative impact of each quality dimension on satisfaction. The time 
series successfully isolated stable levels of customization, reliability, satisfaction, and loyalty for each 
firm. This is indicated by the average communality of the measurement variables, which is the squared 
correlation (loading) between each measure and its latent variable. The average communality exceeded 
the suggested criteria of .5 for every construct in each case (see Fornell & Cha, 1994), indicating high 
reliability among the measures. The average communality across constructs was .808, .852, and .796, 
respectively, for the low, moderate, and high R&D intensity models. These same models explained 94%, 
96%, and 94% of the variation in satisfaction and 23%, 64%, and 59% of the variation in loyalty 
respectively. The latter result suggests that customers are relatively loyalty to particular low R&D firms 
and their products—variation in satisfaction has less effect on their loyalty. This is consistent with 
consumers moving from problem solving to routinized behavior as a product category and its technology 
become quite mature (Howard, 1983). 
 The impacts for reliability and customization on satisfaction are illustrated in Fig. 2. For low 
R&D firms, customization dominates reliability in its impact on satisfaction (.893 vs. .083). Recall that 
we predict this on the basis of constantly changing and heterogeneous customer demand as well as firm-
level differences in dematuration (the creative use of old technology) among low-tech products. The 
Jackknife analysis shows the impact of customization as highly significant (P < .001) while the impact of 
reliability as not significant. For moderate R&D firms, reliability has the significant impact (.587, P < .05) 
while the impact of customization is only marginally significant (.442, P < .10). Importantly, and 
consistent with Hypothesis 2, the impacts are not significantly different from each other. For high R&D 
firms, where we predict that customization is what customers are looking for (technological 
advancements to better serve their needs), customization once again dominates in terms of impact on 
satisfaction. The impact of customization (.855) is significant (P < .001), while the impact of reliability 
(.138) is not significant. 
 The sample of firms in this analysis are predominantly manufacturers of durable or nondurable 
products, with the exception of the four telecommunications firms (GTE, Nynex, Pacific Telesis Group, 
and AT&T). There is some concern that these four firms may confound our results because reliability is 
relatively more important for services firms when compared to manufacturing firms (Johnson & Nilsson, 
2000). To explore this possibility, we removed AT&T from the moderate R&D category and removed 
GTE, Nynex, and Pacific Telesis from the low R&D category and reran the PLS models for these groups. 
Removing the firms had no significant effect on the results. The impacts for customization and reliability 
for low R&D firms in the smaller sample (n = 25) were .873 and .086, respectively (compared to .893 and  
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.083 in the larger sample). The impacts for customization and reliability for moderate R&D firms in the 
smaller sample (n = 10) were .454 and .574, respectively (compared to .442 and .587 in the larger 
sample). 
 The ANOVA results from estimating the general linear model are presented in Table 2. The 
model explains 96% of the variation in satisfaction. (A MANOVA analysis using both satisfaction and 
loyalty as dependent variables in the same analysis yields the same pattern of results reported here.) There 
is a significant (P < .05) main effect for both reliability and customization on overall customer 
satisfaction. The effect of customization is stronger than the effect of reliability, which is consistent with 
previous ACSI analyses (Fornell et al., 1996) and our PLS results. There is also a marginally significant 
main effect of R&D category on satisfaction, where overall satisfaction is slightly higher for low intensity 
products. These are predominantly consumer nondurable products that receive high satisfaction and 
loyalty marks from customers in the ACSI survey. 
 Importantly, the impact of reliability on satisfaction varies as a function of R&D category as 
revealed by the significant two-way interaction involving these variables. In contrast, the interaction 
involving customization and R&D category does not approach significance. The parameter estimates for 
these interactions reveal a pattern of results that is consistent with the hypotheses. The impact of 
reliability on customization is greatest among moderate R&D firms, lower among high R&D firms, and 
lower still among low R&D firms, which is very consistent with our PLS results. The impact of 
customization does not vary overall from category to category. The observed significant interaction 
involving customization and reliability suggests that satisfaction increases even more when a firm excels 
at both quality drivers. Finally, the results reveal a three-way interaction involving customization, 
reliability, and R&D category. That is, the product (interaction) of customization and reliability has a 
greater impact on satisfaction among moderate and high R&D firms. 
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 The key observation is that, as hypothesized, customization and reliability have different impacts 
on satisfaction depending on the R&D category, and the pattern of effects is consistent with our 
theoretical predictions. Overall, the results support hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, and a strong nonmonotonic 
relationship for the relative impact of reliability versus 
 
 
 
customization on satisfaction across R&D levels. Fig. 3 uses the PLS impact scores to show that 
reliability has its greatest relative impact at moderate levels of R&D spending among our sample of firms. 
Section 5 of the paper discusses the meaning of these results for both technology and marketing 
management. 
 
5. Discussion 
 Quality is a key to improving customer satisfaction and loyalty. Yet, quality itself is achieved by 
improving a product’s requirements or specifications (increased customization) and/or reducing things 
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gone wrong (increased reliability). Our study integrates dynamic theories of competition and market 
behavior with an evolutionary theory of technology to develop a model of the relative impact of 
customization versus reliability on satisfaction and loyalty across levels of technological intensity. The 
model predicts that customization is relatively more important among high R&D intensity firms where 
technological advances have their greatest impact on improving customer requirements. Among more 
moderate R&D intensity firms, product innovation and process innovation should have more equal impact 
as differences in ‘‘things-gone-wrong’’ become more important. Among more mature technologies, or 
low R&D intensity firms, customization again becomes the important driver of satisfaction as process 
improvements mature and firms ‘‘demature’’ their technology. That is, they use existing technology in 
new and creative ways to meet ever changing customer needs. 
 In our study of 53 manufacturing firms in the ACSI survey, we found that technology (R&D) 
intensity significantly moderates the relative impact that customization and reliability have on customer 
satisfaction and subsequent loyalty evaluations. Whereas customization is the more important driver of 
satisfaction and loyalty among high and low R&D intensity firms, reliability and customization are more 
equally important among moderate R&D intensity firms. Overall, the results support an inverted-U 
shaped relationship between the relative impact of reliability versus customization on satisfaction and the 
technological intensity of the firms in our study. 
 Our results provide general support for the emergent dynamic theory of competition 
(Dickson, 1992; Hunt & Morgan, 1995). An important component of the dynamic view, and our 
predictions, is that, even though technologies and process improvements mature, customer needs continue 
to evolve and change over time. As a result, there is significant heterogeneity in customer demand that is 
not met by existing products even at the mature stage of a technology life cycle. Within Dickson’s model, 
our results suggest that firms shift their resources from innovation, to learning and imitation, to 
implementation as their technology matures. However, they never achieve complete congruence between 
supply and demand because of constantly changing consumer demand. 
 Our results are also consistent with adaptive views of technology management, wherein firms 
adapt to an aging technology by first moving their resources to process-based improvements and then 
‘‘dematuring’’ existing technology by reconfiguring the technology to meet particular market segment-
level needs. The way in which the resources and strategies of companies are focused is very much 
dependent upon the maturity of their core technology. Our results provide empirical support for a 
common view within companies that it is more important to introduce new technologies before all 
reliability problems are solved. 
 There are two important implications of these results for strategic management of the 
technology–quality process. First, companies can more efficiently allocate technology resources for 
existing product lines by following the normative patterns suggested in these results. Early in the product 
life cycle, extensive investments in reliability improvements are not warranted. It is only after the 
dominant design has emerged that reliability improvement has its greatest payoff. Secondly, general 
managers need to think carefully about the portfolio of products currently offered and how this mix can 
be reconciled with product plans. Those future investments that require new technology need to be 
positioned in a way that maximizes the entire portfolio of offerings. Some will require little or no 
technology or capital investments, while others will require new platforms and significant new product 
investments. Still others will require working relationships with technology suppliers. 
 A central rationale underlying these hypotheses is that firms allocate resources to improve quality 
along two dimensions (customization and reliability). However, this rationale makes two important 
assumptions regarding internal routines in organizations. First, it assumes that technological resources 
will actually be expended for quality improvement and are guided or ‘‘aligned’’ by a consistent, cohesive 
strategy. Second, the rationale discounts the use of other resources (such as empowerment and continuous 
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improvement) for quality improvement. Future research should be directed toward understanding how 
such factors affect both our predictions and results. 
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